However, they are becoming more popular and have featured in a number of major transactions, including the BP/Amoco merger. Successful implementation of break-fee arrangements gives rise to a number of UK corporate law and regulatory issues, and market practice in this area is developing.
CODE APPLIES
The Takeover Code applies where the target company is a UK pic. The Takeover Panel, which oversees regulation of takeovers in the UK, will act to ensure that the target's shareholders are not adversely affected by break fee arrangements, since these will necessarily reduce offeree shareholders' funds.
Under a typical break-fee arrangement, one party to a takeover (usually the target but sometimes a major shareholder in the target) will agree at the outset of the transaction to pay a fee if the transaction does not proceed. Circumstances in which this type of arrangement will take effect include the following:
(1) the target board withdraws its recommendation for a transaction;
(2) the target board recommends a
proposal by a third party;
(3) the acquisition proposal lapses because of (a) a merger reference;
(b) unsatisfactory due diligence; (c) the target board takes prohibited steps (e.g. negotiates with a competing bidder).
The commercial rationale for payment of break fees has been questioned but they can provide certainty for a target company by tying in the offerer to the sale process and, from the offerer's point of view, provide a degree of comfort and help to minimise the risk of being outbid by a third party. They can also provide assurance of payment of the very large professional fees, advisory costs and management time which can be involved in takeovers and mergers.
LEGAL ISSUES
The effect of paying a break fee is to move the risk of failure of the bid from the offerer to the target and ultimately 
Directors' duties
In deciding whether to pay a break fee, the target's directors must balance the interest of the company in ensuring that the offer proceeds against the possible deterrent effect of the fee arrangement on the making of rival offers and the cost o to the company if a break fee has to be paid. To carry out their duty to exercise their judgment in an informed and independent fashion, and to act in the company's best interests, directors must be particularly careful to ensure that they are not acting for a collateral purpose, for example, treating the break fee as a means of discouraging an unwelcome, The directors must also ensure that they do not fetter their discretion in advising shareholders as to the merits of o any potential competing offer. This will largely be a matter of the size of the fee in question. It is thought unlikely that a court would hold a break fee of less than 1 per cent of the target's net assets to be large enough to restrict the directors' ability properly to advise.
Financial assistance
The 
COMMERCIAL RATIONALE
The commercial rationale for payment of break fees has been questioned but they can provide certainty' for a target company by tying in the offeror to the sale process and, from the offerer's point of view, provide a degree of comfort and help to minimise the risk of being outbid by a third party. They can also provide assurance of payment of the very large professional fees, advisory costs and management time which can be involved in takeovers and mergers.
The first issue in relation to break fees is whether the financial assistance provisions are relevant at all, given that payment of the fee will normally take place in circumstances where an offer has failed and no acquisition of shares has taken place. Although the point is untested in the courts the arrangement should be assessed at the time when the potential financial assistance is given, i.e.
when the arrangement is entered into, as there might be judged to be financial assistance even where the attempted acquisition has failed.
In addition to the whitewash procedure for private companies, there are a number of exemptions from the prohibition on the giving of financial assistance. These include cases where the company's principal purpose in giving the assistance is not to give it for the purpose of the acquisition, but is an incidental part of some larger purpose and is given in good faith in the interests of the company (s. 153(l)(a), CA 85).
However, the courts have held that this exemption only applies where there is a corporate act on the part of the company giving the financial assistance and the target's role in the transaction may well be passive.
The types of financial assistance likely to be relevant to break fee arrangements are financial assistance by way of gift, financial assistance given by way of guarantee, security or indemnity and other types of financial assistance given by a company which either has no net assets or which, as a result, has its net assets reduced to a material extent (s. 152(1), CA 85).
It would be unusual for break fees to be paid by way of gift. They will often be expressed to be paid by the target in consideration of the offerer incurring costs by proceeding with the bid and in these circumstances no question of a gift arises. However, if the sum which the target agrees to pay the offeror is calculated by reference to the costs incurred by the offeror in making the offer, it will be classified as an indemnity.
One way of avoiding this is for the parties to agree at the outset a pre-determined fixed fee, which is negotiated 
Takeover Code
There is also a concern that, where the target's board has received an approach from another party, a bona fide offer may be frustrated by the arrangements. The panel has introduced two safeguards: a requirement that any break fee be 'de minimis', which will normally mean no more than 1 per cent of the offer value an amount similar to the figure for judging the 'materiality' of any reduction in net assets for financial assistance purposes mentioned above; and confirmation by the target's board and that of its financial advisers that they believe the fee to be in the best interests of shareholders. This takes the form of a private comfort letter from the financial adviser describing the background to the negotiations leading to the agreement to pay the inducement fee and explaining why it is thought appropriate to pay a fee if there is a potential competing offer. It will also contain an opinion on behalf of the financial adviser, and board to the effect that the fee is fair and reasonable and in shareholders' best interests.
Contract
Another point which may need to be considered is whether particular break 
